

Cybersecurity für Medizinprodukte – Wie geht man vor ?



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Regulatory Affairs Expert

CE+ CE plus

CE+ Service Provider for Regulatory Affairs

CE+ Medical Devices

CE+ In Vitro Diagnostics

CE+ Active Implantable Devices

CE+ Focus: CE-marking

CE+ Regulatory Strategies (e.g. Definition of Intended Use)

CE+ Technical File

CE+ Software Documentation

CE+ Risk Management

CE+ Requirements Engineering

CE+ Usability

CE+ Clinical Evaluation

Introduction

-  Safety & Security

-  Requirements from the directive / regulation

Standard / Norm to cybersecurity

Integration of cybersecurity into medical software development lifecycle

Case study

Summary

 „Medical device vulnerable to hackers“

 „Insulin pump can be hacked“

 „Big issue: Cybersecurity!“

 Data breaches must be reported to the authority under the new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)

Definition:

Freedom from unacceptable **risk**

(ISO/IEC Guide 51:1999, definition 3.1)

Safety

Combination of the probability of occurrence of **harm** and the severity of that **harm**

(ISO/IEC Guide 51:1999, definition 3.2)

Risk

Physical injury or damage to the health of people, or damage to property or the environment

(ISO/IEC Guide 51:1999, definition 3.2)

Harm

Definition: **Security**

Condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of **inviolability from hostile acts or influences**

(IEC Guide 120)

Data and systems security

Operational state of a medical device in which information assets (data and systems) **are reasonably protected from degradation of confidentiality, integrity, and availability**


(AAMI TIR 57)

Definition (revisited): **Harm**

Physical injury or damage to the health of people, or damage to property or the environment, **or reduction in effectiveness, or breach of data and systems security**


IEC 80001-1, AAMI TIR 57

CE+ Relationship between safety and security risk



Source: AAMI TIR 57

CE+ Fundamental difference




 Security is not mentioned in MDD

 How about MDR ?

MDR, Annex I: General safety and performance requirements


17.2) For devices that incorporate software or for software that are devices in themselves, the software shall be developed and manufactured in accordance with the state of the art taking into account the principle of development life cycle, risk management, including **information security**, verification and validation

Why Cybersecurity ?









CE+ Any norm/standard/Guidance to Cybersecurity ?

CE+ **Yes !**



Why ?

-  Established norm for industrial automation, industry 4.0
-  FDA recognized (62443-1-1, 62443-2-1, 62443-3-1)
-  In 2016, first certification according to IEC 62443 in Germany by TÜV Süd
-  Offer connecting point to development process norm
-  Direct relationship to IEC 61508-1
 -  „7.5.2.2 *If security threats have been identified, then a vulnerabilities analysis should be undertaken in order to specify security requirements.* **NOTE Guidance is given in IEC 62443 series.**“ (Source: IEC 61508-1:2010)

FDA recognized



IEC 62443: Industrial communication networks – Network and system security

General		Policies & Procedures		System		Component/Product	
1-1	Terminology, concepts and models	2-1	Requirements for an IACS security management system	3-1	Security technologies for IACS	4-1	Secure product development lifecycle requirements
1-2	Master glossary of terms and abbreviations	2-2	Implementation guidance for an IACS security management system	3-2	Security risk assessment and system design	4-2	Technical security requirements for IACS components
1-3	System security compliance metrics	2-3	Patch management in the IACS environment	3-3	System security requirements and security levels		
1-4	IACS security lifecycle and use-case	2-4	Security program requirements for IACS service providers				

■ veröffentlicht

Source: ZVEI

62443-1-1

Security objective
(CIA)

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability

Threat-risk assessment
(Asset, Vulnerabilities,
Threat, Consequence,
Risk)

62443-4-1

Process requirements
for the secure
development of
product

Secure development
life-cycle (SDL):
Security requirements,
Secure design, Secure
implementation,
verification and
validation

62443-3-2

Security risk
assessment based on
the concept of zone
and conduit, threat,
vulnerabilities,
impact,...

Intended for: asset
owner, system
integrator, service
provider,...

CE+ Manufacturer's approach for device cybersecurity

CE+ Intended Use

CE+ To find the ground for optimal measures for safety and security

CE+ Intended Environment

CE+ Constrain the relevant attack scenarios

CE+ Threat / Risk Analysis (TRA)

CE+ Instruction for (secure) Use

CE+ Vulnerabilities that cannot be mitigated technically shall be documented as user measures

CE+ Use Secure Development Life-cycle



- ❖ Cybersecurity measures must not interfere with the essential function of the device
- ❖ Intended environment limits the impact (consequence) of the security threats

Threat / Risk Analysis according to **AAMI TIR 57**

Risk = F(threats, vulnerabilities, impacts)

CE+ Threat / Risk Analysis according to **AAMI TIR 57**

CE+ **Comparison of terminologies:**

ISO 14971	AAMI TIR 57
Harm	Harm* *(with extended definition)
Hazard	Vulnerability
Hazardous situation	Threat event
Probability of occurrence of harm	Likelihood of occurrence
Risk	Risk

CE+ Medical device software – Software life cycle processes (IEC 62304)

CE+ Goal:

CE+ **Safety**

CE+ **Effectiveness**

CE+ What about security ?

Definition:

Security: protection of information and data so that unauthorized people or systems cannot read or modify them and so that authorized persons or systems are not denied access to them

CE+ What about security ? (IEC 62304)

Security requirements

Example includes:

- those related to the compromise of sensitive information
- authentication
- Authorization
- Audit trail, and
- Communication integrity





Regarding security aspects, it is still not sufficient !

- Ⓢ Medical device software – Software life cycle processes (IEC 62304)
 - Ⓢ Use of only IEC 62304 is not sufficient for secure development life cycle (SDL) !

- Ⓢ Approach:
 - Ⓢ IEC 62304 + 62443-4-1
 - Ⓢ Based on process requirements in IEC 62304, activities and artifacts are extended to include the security aspects




CE+ IEC 62304 + Security Concept according to IEC 62443-4-1







Implantable Defibrillator

Intended Use (Essential function)

-  Transmit patient information wirelessly
-  Transmit device status wirelessly
-  Provide therapy

Programmer

Intended Use (Essential function)

-  Set/Get patient information wirelessly
-  Set therapy parameter wirelessly

Intended Environment

-  Clinic & hospital use

CE+ Scenario

CE+ The programmer and defibrillator use a static unique identifier with each transmission to provide authentication

CE+ Threat event

CE+ „An attacker eavesdrops the wireless communication and captures the unique identifier and data packet. The attacker modifies the data, changes the therapy logic and send the data packet to the defibrillator.“

CE+ Impact

CE+ Patient data disclosure -> **Data breach**

CE+ Patient therapy modification -> **Harm**

CE+ Security risk estimation

Risk ID	Asset	Threat	Vulnerability	Likelihood	Impact
1	Patient data	Attacker gets access to patient data	Lack of encryption on transmitted data	Medium	Medium: Disclosure of patient data
2	Patient therapy	Attacker manipulate the therapy by changing therapy parameter	Lack of authentication of transmitted data	Medium	High: Inappropriate therapy, death

Risk ID 1  Confidentiality breach

Risk ID 2  Integrity breach

CE+ Residual security risk estimation

Risk ID	Asset	Threat	Measure	Likelihood (Post-Mitigation)	Impact (Post-Mitigation)
1	Patient data	Attacker gets access to patient data	Cryptographic Encryption (e.g. symmetric key)	Low	Medium: Disclosure of patient data
2	Patient therapy	Attacker manipulate the therapy by changing therapy parameter	Cryptographic Authentication (e.g. Message Authentication Code (MAC))	Low	High: Inappropriate therapy, death



Secure Development Life-cycle

- Ⓢ **IEC 62443** norm series could be used as a guideline for an addition to 62304

- Ⓢ Approach for device manufacturers
 - Ⓢ Formulate the **Intended Use** and the **Intended Environment**
 - Ⓢ Perform **Threat/Risk Analysis (TRA)**
 - Ⓢ Design/Develop the product by considering **Secure Development Life-cycle**
 - Ⓢ Use **IEC 62443-4-1 with IEC 62304**
 - Ⓢ Also consider other standard/guidance as appropriate, e.g UL standard, FDA guidance,..



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MEDICAL DEVICE & IN VITRO DIAGNOSTICS

REGULATORY AFFAIRS SOLUTIONS STRATEGIES

